Uzi Dayan to over 18,000 dunams) and thus areas where some of the nearby Jahalin communities lived, including Al-Khan al-Ahmar, became part of Kfar Adumim's territory, all without moving from their location. Ironically, a number of right-wing organizations and Kfar Adumim communities are leading a campaign that centers on the claim that the Jahalin are the ones taking over Kfar Adumim's lands.

In 2009, a primary school was established in Khan al-Ahmar for the children of the Jahalin tribe, after decades of not attending school at all, or traveling to Jericho and Abu Dis for that purpose. With the help of an Italian association, the residents built an ecological school from used tires filled with mud and reinforced with old falafel oil. Almost 200 children walk from all the surrounding hills in the morning with schoolbags on their backs to attend school. A few solar panels provide the little electricity needed to power light bulbs and one computer in the principal's room. In accordance with the Oslo Accords, the education of Palestinian citizens in Area C is the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority, which provides a meager budget, curricula, and teachers. In accordance with Bedouin tradition, classes are supposed to be separate for boys and girls, but due to the lack of enough classes, the younger ones study in mixed classes. The school teaches up to the seventh grade, after which students are required to travel to Abu Dis or Jericho for high school. A large portion of the students drop out of school at this stage, both due to the inconvenience of getting to a remote location with unreliable and inconsistent transportation, and due to the need to go to work to help support the family. However, the rate of students graduating from high school is steadily increasing, largely thanks to the elementary school that provides easy access to elementary education. However, following the construction of the school, Kfar Adumim and the far-right association Regavim filed repeated petitions to the High Court of Justice demanding that the Civil Administration implement the demolition orders against the school and the village. A group formed within Kfar Adumim, the Good Neighborhood Forum, was outraged that Kfar Adumim was waging war against the only educational structure in the entire region for Bedouin children.

The legal battle

Over the course of a decade, starting in 2005, the High Court of Justice rejected three petitions by the communities of Kfar Adumim and the far-right organization "Regavim" to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar, claiming that it does not interfere with the state's planning discretion regarding state lands. When Minister Lieberman took office as Defense Minister in 2016, the state suddenly changed its position and announced that it had decided to demolish the Khan.

As a general rule, "state lands" are lands that are not private and that the sovereign is entrusted with managing. In Judea and Samaria, this refers to someone who temporarily steps into the sovereign's shoes - the Israeli military commander, since this is in accordance with the law in an occupied territory, also according to Israeli law.

According to international law, an occupying state is prohibited from exploiting the territories under its control for its own needs, except for limited security needs. In other words, Israel is prohibited from making “state lands” its own, and they are supposed to be used for the needs of the local population – for example, for the establishment of settlements, the development of infrastructure, roads, public buildings, and parks.

The Civil Administration adopted a mechanism of declaring “state lands” to take possession of land that it considers to be government property. After the declaration, the land can be allocated or permission given for its use. In the early 1980s, following the High Court of Justice ruling in Alon Moreh that prohibited Israel from establishing settlements on lands seized by military orders, the military government began declaring hundreds of thousands of dunams in the West Bank as “state lands.” Outrageously, Israel does not disclose the exact figure regarding the extent of “state lands” in the area, but according to the comments, their extent exceeds 2,000,000 dunams. Israel uses these areas almost exclusively for the benefit of the settlement project (information from Yesh Din’s 2021 “Shepherds in Foreign Fields” report).

When the High Court of Justice demanded that the residents of Khan al-Ahmar be given alternative housing before the demolition, in 2017 the state offered plots in Abu Dis that had been prepared several years earlier for another Bedouin community that wanted them, in the Ma'ale Adumim area. These plots were not occupied due to ownership claims by residents of Abu Dis who are challenging the declaration that they are state lands. In addition, the plots are adjacent to Ma'ale Adumim's old municipal landfill. However, these difficulties were not the main reason for the residents of Khan's refusal to move to the plots, but rather the recognition that moving to the neighborhood in Abu Dis would suddenly interrupt the traditional desert Bedouin culture that has been practiced among them for centuries. If they are required to move, they are asking for a proper arrangement that takes into account the needs of the communities and their unique way of life.

In May 2018, the High Court of Justice ruled that, just as it had not previously intervened in the forced demolition, it found no legal grounds to intervene in the decision to implement the demolition orders, leaving the state with discretion regarding the future of the place. For various reasons, including a statement by the prosecution at the International Court of Justice in The Hague that moving Khan al-Ahmar would constitute a war crime and grounds for opening an investigation against Israel, the state decided not to implement the demolition orders. The prosecution's statement in The Hague is based on international law, which states that a local population in an occupied territory may not be moved except in specific and exceptional cases, which do not apply in this case. The European Parliament, the United Nations mission, and a long list of American Congress members publicly supported the prosecutor's statement in The Hague. The residents of Khan al-Ahmar are not Israeli citizens, but citizens of the Palestinian Authority, hence the legal problematic nature of forced eviction.

Therefore, in 2020, another petition, the fifth in number, was filed by "regavim" against the state, seeking, once again, to demolish Al-Khan al-Ahmar and expel the residents. The state has asked the High Court of Justice several times for an extension to present an outline for the settlement. The state's request stated that there had been "significant progress" in formulating an outline for the settlement of the Khan. In addition, the state requested to present to the judges a confidential document on the subject based, according to various publications, on an opinion from the Foreign Ministry according to which the demolition of the community could harm Israel's foreign relations, advance the interests of the Palestinian Authority in the world, and expose Israel to lawsuits at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. At the same time, it was announced that the state is interested in settling Al-Khan al-Ahmar on a small area of state land near the original location, far from the road, and with the feasibility of a permanent settlement, including infrastructure. The settlements of Kfar Adumim, the Yesha Council, and right-wing organizations opposed the plan on the principle that a Bedouin-free zone should be established in the northern Judean Desert. Supreme Court Justice Noam Solberg criticized the state and said that it must decide what the fate of the place is - evacuation or settlement. He said that leaving the situation with a promise of evacuation without actually evacuating is unacceptable. Various jurists expressed surprise at Solberg's criticism, which is an exception in such hearings and is not based, for example, on demolition orders that have been pending for many years on dozens of Jewish outposts in the area. The court's traditional tendency is to allow the state to decide on enforcement and planning priorities while managing national interest considerations as long as they do not infringe on private property rights, such as in the cases of Migron and Netiv Ha'avot (which is not true in the case of Al-Khan al-Ahmar).

In another hearing held in May 2023, the High Court rejected the "Regavim" petition while continuing to allow the state to determine the fate of the families living in Al-Khan al-Ahmar. The land on which they sit is state land, and therefore the families can be provided with permits, thus making the construction approved, no less than the Jewish outposts in the area are being regulated. In 2025, another petition was filed by the Regavim Association, the seventh in number, to the District Court, which was rejected in January 2026 following the state's announcement that it was still obligated to demolish Al-Khan al-Ahmar, but that the appropriate conditions had not yet been met, in allusion to Israel's international status.

Alternatives Offered by the State to the Residents of Khan al-Ahmar

In response to the Supreme Court’s requirement of providing alternative housing to the residents of Khan al-Ahmar prior to demolition, the state presented two options. In September 2017, plots of land in Abu Dis (Al Jabal West) were offered as an alternative. These plots had been previously prepared for another Bedouin community in the Ma’ale Adumim area, in which they expressed an interest in acquiring. These lands are situated within a narrow strip of land between the developed area of Abu Dis and a main road. The proposal was put forth by Kobi Eliraz, the representative of the Minister of Defense for Settlement Affairs in the Territories, who has since become a vocal advocate for halting Palestinian construction and promoting demolitions. 

The reason these plots remain empty is due to ownership disputes raised by residents of the Salmat faction in Abu Dis, who challenge the assertion that these lands belong to the state. Furthermore, the plots are adjacent to the old municipal landfill of Ma’ale Adumim and have limited grazing areas. Another option suggested by right-wing organizations, although not seriously pursued, is relocating all Bedouins in the northern Judean desert to a designated area near Jericho. However, professionals involved in the matter recognize that the traditional familial division of the Bedouin community is essential for any future arrangement. 

Nevertheless, these challenges were not the primary reasons for the residents of Khan al-Ahmar rejecting the proposed alternatives. Their refusal stemmed primarily from the realization that moving to urban-adjacent neighborhoods would disrupt their traditional Bedouin culture, which has been preserved for hundreds of years. If relocation is necessary, they insist on a proper arrangement that takes into account the unique needs of their communities and their way of life.

On the other hand, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar presented several alternatives in geographic proximity to their current location, that would not disrupt the settlements adjacent to Highway 1 in any way. The state rejected these proposals without engaging in any meaningful discussions or deliberations. Mediators involved in the negotiations between the Bedouin community and the state received the impression that the state’s proposals and actions, fueled by right-wing parties, were aimed at creating an area devoid of non-Jewish settlements, even if it meant forcibly displacing residents. 

It is worth noting that, over the years, the Jahalin communities have submitted no fewer than 12 construction plans through the organization “Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights,” yet none of these plans have been seriously considered by the relevant authorities. This pattern suggests a complete disregard for the residents’ proposals and their legitimate housing needs. The alternatives put forth by right-wing organizations raise suspicions that their underlying objective is to cluster Bedouin families in close proximity to Palestinian cities, thereby effectively eliminating the presence of Bedouin in the northern Judean desert. One of the ways to reach this goal is the erasure of the desert Bedouin culture by eliminating their ability to graze livestock and severing their deep-rooted connection to the desert environment.  

According to the professional opinion of the planners from “Bimkom,” submitted to the Supreme Court in response to the state’s proposals, “any solution for the population of Khan al-Ahmar must consider all of the social and cultural elements at play, without ignoring existing conflicts (as was the case in the arbitrary decision to relocate the Abu-Dahoch family from Khan al-Ahmar to residences near Abu Dis).” The planners further stated that, with the help of “Bimkom,” the residents themselves took on the responsibility of initiating a planning process to address the needs of the community and provide sustainable solutions and a long-term vision.

Over an extended period, the architects met with the Jahalin families to develop a plan that, while compromising certain aspects of their way of life, acknowledges the spatial limitations of the region. The initial response of the deputy director of the Planning Bureau was an immediate rejection of the plans, as they did not adhere to the criteria set by the Civil Administration. Yet, despite the revised plans being submitted almost four years ago, no professional response has been received from the Civil Administration to date.

Responses to Common Misconceptions

1. "The Palestinian Authority and the European Union settled the residents of Khan al-Ahmar in recent years in order to dispossess Jewish settlement in Area C."

Response: Photographic evidence from as early as 1974 shows the presence of the first tents in Khan al-Ahmar. Over the years, minimal growth has occurred, with the population increasing less than the natural birth rate. Currently, after decades of presence in the region, only 28 families reside in the area. The Civil Administration maintains detailed records of all residents through periodic military censuses. All residents, without exception, belong to the Jahalin tribe, and most of them were born in Khan al-Ahmar. Moreover, the European Union has not constructed a single residential building in Khan al-Ahmar.

2.  "The Bedouins are pawns of the Palestinian Authority and the European Union, both of whom use them for their own needs. The struggle is against the Palestinian Authority, and not the Bedouins."
Response: It is unjustifiable to forcibly remove vulnerable individuals, who have not caused harm to anyone, from their home. Therefore, right-wing factions have fabricated a ‘false enemy’ in the guise of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the European Union, to rationalize their actions. Framing the situation as a battle against the Palestinian Authority may seem morally justifiable, but it diverts attention from the real issue at hand. By needlessly engaging in a struggle against 28 impoverished families in Khan al-Ahmar, certain groups have unintentionally turned it into a focal point for nationalist tensions associated with the Palestinian Authority. However, it is not too late to rectify the situation. Since temporarily halting efforts to displace the residents of Khan al-Ahmar, the presence of PA officials has diminished, allowing the community to revert to its previous state as a small, peaceful settlement that has embraced a tranquil and modest way of life for decades.
3. “Just as Amona and Nativ Ha’avot were evacuated, Khan al-Ahmar must also be evacuated. What's the difference?”

Response:  The demolition of any family home is undoubtedly a devastating event. Our intention is not to justify the destruction of Jewish outposts, but rather to emphasize the fundamental distinctions that clearly separate these unrelated incidents from Khan al-Ahmar.
The following are the differences:

• Nativ Ha’avot and Amona were evacuated by order of the Supreme Court because they were built on private Palestinian land. Khan al-Ahmar was also built on private Palestinian land, with the permission of the land owners, but the land was expropriated in 1975 and is now considered state land.

• While the Supreme Court ruled that Nativ Ha’avot and Amona should be demolished due to their erection on private Palestinian land, it did not specifically order the demolition of Khan al-Ahmar. Instead, the court ruled that it will not interfere with the state’s considerations. The state has the authority to determine the status of Khan al-Ahmar, as it has done with the illegal construction of surrounding Jewish settlements built long after the establishment of Khan al-Ahmar.

• Despite these differences, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar would be content with a solution similar to what was given to the residents of Nativ Ha’avot. In the case of Nativ Ha’avot, the state funded a move to a temporary settlement a few hundred meters from the original location, is constructing a new neighborhood for Nativ Ha’avot with the necessary modifications, and is providing financial compensation for the move back to the permanent homes. The residents of Khan al-Ahmar, however, are settling for much less – they are willing to evacuate, plan, and build according to a state-approved plan without any compensation, but have not been permitted to do so.

4.  “The Bedouin are criminals for building on land belonging to Jewish settlements in the area.”

It is worth noting the irony here – the same right-wing factions who advocate for the destruction of illegal Bedouin construction are often involved in the establishment of illegal outposts located within just a few hundred meters from Khan al-Ahmar (including Givat Haro’im, Hill 468, and another nearby outpost). This points to a certain level of cynicism amongst the Jewish settlements in the area – they demand the demolition of Kahn al-Ahmar’s structures, while their own commonly accepted practice involves illegal construction followed by obtaining permits retroactively.

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