Khan-al-Ahmar was settled on lands belonging to the people of Anata, with their consent. Later on, in the 1970’s, the State of Israel declared an appropriation of 7,000 acres of land, which were partly allocated for the development of Ma’ale Adumim, Mishor Adumim, and Mizpe Jericho. The Supreme Court criticized this move vehemently, but did not intervene in what the state claimed was a “defensive necessity,” in light of the prolonged delay between the appropriation and the court hearing. Khan-al-Ahmar was included in the appropriated land; as such, community members found themselves situated on land that had been ‘confiscated’ by the state, and were refused the right to build there.

 

Over the years, the municipal area of Kfar Adumim, which was initially defined as 1,000 acres, has been expanded through general orders (in 1992 by Danny Yatom and later in two strokes, the last of which was issued in 1998 by Uzi Dayan, securing an expansion to over 4,450 acres). As a result, areas on which some of the nearby Jahalin communities lived, including Khan-al-Ahmar, suddenly found themselves included in Kfar Adumim’s territory, and all this without the Jahalin ever moving from their original location. Ironically, a number of right-wing organizations and the settlements of Kfar Adumim claim that the Jahalin are the ones encroaching on lands belonging to Kfar Adumim.

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In 2009, an elementary school was erected for Jahalin children, who up until then had no choice but to attend schools in Jericho or Abu Dis, a bus ride away. With support from an Italian organization, the inhabitants of Khan-al-Ahmar built an ecological school out of old tires filled with earth, sealing them with used cooking oil. Nearly 200 children walk to the school each day from the hillsides surrounding Khan-al-Ahmar, with their school bags strapped to their backs. A few solar panels supply the scant electricity needed to operate the school’s lights and a single computer in the principal’s office. 

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According to the Oslo agreements, education for Palestinians in Area C is the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority which provides a small budget, the curriculum, and teachers.

As per Bedouin custom, classes are meant to be segregated between boys and girls, but given the lack of space, younger students learn together in co-ed classrooms from 1st to 7th grade. After this, many drop out of school, in part due to the unreliable bus transportation to and from Jericho or Abu Dis, and largely due to their need to start working and supporting their families. Despite this, the number of students who complete high school is continuously rising, thanks to the elementary school’s accessibility.

In reaction to the construction of the school, Kfar Adumim, in collaboration with the ultra-right-wing organization “Regavim,” has repeatedly submitted petitions to Israel’s Supreme Court, urging the Civil Administration to implement the demolition orders issued against both the village and the school. Simultaneously, a group of passionate residents has surfaced from within Kfar Adumim to speak out against the prevailing injustice, concerned with how a settlement boasting numerous schools and kindergartens could wage such a struggle against the sole educational facility accessible to Bedouin children in the immediate area.

 

Kfar Adumim’s activity against the school in Khan-al-Ahmar is the fulfillment of the settlement’s founding charter from 1978, as signed by former minister Uri Ariel. It states that “In the area there are many Bedouin who are also cultivating the land…the area should be blocked off from any further Bedouin settlement and they should be evacuated in order to ensure an unbroken chain of Jewish settlement.”

The Legal Battle

Over the course of a decade, there have been significant legal battles surrounding the fate of Khan al-Ahmar. The settlements of Kfar Adumim, together with the right-wing organization “Regavim,” initiated 3 separate petitions to evict the Jahalin community. However, the Supreme Court consistently rejected these petitions, on the basis that the community does not infringe upon the state’s planning decisions concerning state lands. The situation took a turn when Minister Lieberman assumed his role as Minister of Defense in 2016. The state’s stance shifted, and the decision to demolish Khan al-Ahmar was announced. 

 

What are state lands? It is important to understand that, in the context of the West Bank, land holds immense importance as a valuable resource. One strategy employed by Israel to exert control over land in the occupied territories is to declare it as "state land." As a general rule, "state lands" refer to non-private lands that are entrusted to the management of the governing authority – in this case, the Israeli military commander temporarily assuming the role of sovereign under the occupation regime in the West Bank. 

 

According to the Hague Convention, the occupying country is designated as the trustee and beneficiary of public buildings, immovable property, forests, and agricultural enterprises located in the occupied territory, but belonging to the enemy country. The occupying power is prohibited from utilizing the territories under its control for its own purposes, except for limited security needs. Therefore, in compliance with international law, Israel is not permitted to encroach upon “state lands.” These lands are intended to serve the needs of the local population in the West Bank, for example, in establishing settlements, developing infrastructure, constructing roads, public buildings, and parks.

 

The Civil Administration implemented a mechanism for declaring lands as “state lands,” with the aim of acquiring land it deems as government property. Once declared, these lands can be allocated or granted for various uses, such as residential, employment, agricultural, grazing, infrastructure development, and open spaces. In the early 1980’s, following the Alon Moreh Supreme Court ruling that prohibited Israel from establishing settlements on territories seized through military orders, the military government began declaring hundreds of thousands of dunams in the West Bank as “state lands.” Unfortunately, the exact extent of “state lands” in the West Bank remains undisclosed by Israel, a matter that is deeply frustrating. During court hearings related to this matter, the state even claimed that the Civil Administration does not maintain accurate data regarding the exact size of “state lands” in the occupied territories.

 

Estimates indicate that the extent of “state lands” in the West Bank exceeds 2,000,000 dunams, and these areas are primarily utilized by Israel to advance the development of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (this information is derived from Yesh Din’s 2021 report entitled “Shepherds in Foreign Fields”).

 

When the Supreme Court ruled that residents of Khan al-Ahmar should be provided with an alternative place to reside prior to demolition, the state offered plots in Abu Dis in 2017. These plots had been prepared several years prior for another Bedouin community in the Ma’ale Adumim area. Despite their desire to move there, the occupation of these plots was hindered due to ownership disputes raised by residents of Abu Dis who contested the declaration of these lands as state-owned. In addition, these plots are adjacent to the old municipal landfill of Ma’ale Adumim. Yet these challenges were not the primary reason for the residents of Khan al-Ahmar rejecting the relocation to the Abu Dis neighborhood. Their refusal stemmed from the realization that such a move would sever their deep-rooted desert Bedouin culture, which had been preserved for centuries. If relocation is required, they insist on a proper arrangement that considers the needs of their communities and respects their unique way of life.

 

In May 2018, the Supreme Court rendered a ruling stating that, similar to its previous stance of not intervening to enforce the demolition, it did not find legal grounds to intervene in the decision to carry out the demolition orders. In addition, it left the decision regarding the future of the location to the discretion of the state. For various reasons, including the potential for the relocation of Khan al-Ahmar to constitute a war crime and grounds for opening an investigation against Israel, the state decided not to implement the demolition orders.  

 

The submission of the claim in The Hague is based on the principles of international law, which dictate that the transfer of a local population in occupied territories should only occur in specified and exceptional cases that do not apply in this particular scenario. The statement of the prosecutor in The Hague has received public support from various entities, including the European Parliament, a United Nations delegation, and numerous American congressmen. It is worth noting that the residents of Khan al-Ahmar are not Israeli citizens but rather citizens of the Palestinian Authority, which adds a layer of legal complexity to the issue of forced eviction.

 

Therefore, in 2020, a fifth petition was filed by “Regavim” against the state, once again seeking the destruction of Khan al-Ahmar and the displacement of its residents. The state has requested multiple extensions from the Supreme Court to present a settlement plan. At the state’s request, we note here that there has been “significant progress” in formulating a settlement outline for the Khan. Moreover, the state has requested to present a confidential document to the judges, reportedly based on an opinion from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which highlights that demolishing the community could harm Israel’s foreign relations, serve the interests of the Palestinian Authority on the international stage, and potentially expose Israel to lawsuits at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Simultaneously, it was announced that the state intends to relocate Khan al-Ahmar to a small area of state lands near its original site. The proposed location would be situated away from the road and include the necessary infrastructure for a sustainable and permanent settlement. However, the plan has faced opposition from Kfar Adumim, the Yesha Council, and right-wing organizations who advocate for establishing a Bedouin-free area in the northern Judean desert.

 

The Supreme Court has thus far granted extensions in the case, but Chief Justice Noam Solberg, criticized the state’s approach and emphasized that a decision must be made regarding the fate of the site – evacuation or regularization. According to Solberg, an ongoing promise of evacuation without actually evacuating is unacceptable. Solberg’s criticism stands out as an exception in such discussions, as it is not typically raised in relation to long-pending demolition orders on numerous Jewish outposts in the region. Traditionally, the court tends to grant the state the authority to determine priorities for enforcement and planning while considering national interests, as long as they do not infringe upon private property rights, such as in the cases of Migron and Nativ Ha’avot (this does not hold true in the case of Khan al-Ahmar). 

 

In the most recent hearing held in May 2023, the Supreme Court rejected the petition filed by “Regavim” and continued to defer the determination of the fate of the families residing in Khan al-Ahmar to the state. The land they inhabit is classified as “state land,” providing an opportunity to grant permits to the families and thereby legalize the construction, no differently than what occurs when regulating Jewish outposts in the area.

Alternatives Offered by the State to the Residents of Khan al-Ahmar

In response to the Supreme Court’s requirement of providing alternative housing to the residents of Khan al-Ahmar prior to demolition, the state presented two options. In September 2017, plots of land in Abu Dis (Al Jabal West) were offered as an alternative. These plots had been previously prepared for another Bedouin community in the Ma’ale Adumim area, in which they expressed an interest in acquiring. These lands are situated within a narrow strip of land between the developed area of Abu Dis and a main road. The proposal was put forth by Kobi Eliraz, the representative of the Minister of Defense for Settlement Affairs in the Territories, who has since become a vocal advocate for halting Palestinian construction and promoting demolitions. 

 

The reason these plots remain empty is due to ownership disputes raised by residents of the Salmat faction in Abu Dis, who challenge the assertion that these lands belong to the state. Furthermore, the plots are adjacent to the old municipal landfill of Ma’ale Adumim and have limited grazing areas. Another option suggested by right-wing organizations, although not seriously pursued, is relocating all Bedouins in the northern Judean desert to a designated area near Jericho. However, professionals involved in the matter recognize that the traditional familial division of the Bedouin community is essential for any future arrangement. 

 

Nevertheless, these challenges were not the primary reasons for the residents of Khan al-Ahmar rejecting the proposed alternatives. Their refusal stemmed primarily from the realization that moving to urban-adjacent neighborhoods would disrupt their traditional Bedouin culture, which has been preserved for hundreds of years. If relocation is necessary, they insist on a proper arrangement that takes into account the unique needs of their communities and their way of life.

 

On the other hand, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar presented several alternatives in geographic proximity to their current location, that would not disrupt the settlements adjacent to Highway 1 in any way. The state rejected these proposals without engaging in any meaningful discussions or deliberations. Mediators involved in the negotiations between the Bedouin community and the state received the impression that the state’s proposals and actions, fueled by right-wing parties, were aimed at creating an area devoid of non-Jewish settlements, even if it meant forcibly displacing residents. 

 

It is worth noting that, over the years, the Jahalin communities have submitted no fewer than 12 construction plans through the organization “Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights,” yet none of these plans have been seriously considered by the relevant authorities. This pattern suggests a complete disregard for the residents’ proposals and their legitimate housing needs. The alternatives put forth by right-wing organizations raise suspicions that their underlying objective is to cluster Bedouin families in close proximity to Palestinian cities, thereby effectively eliminating the presence of Bedouin in the northern Judean desert. One of the ways to reach this goal is the erasure of the desert Bedouin culture by eliminating their ability to graze livestock and severing their deep-rooted connection to the desert environment.  

 

According to the professional opinion of the planners from “Bimkom,” submitted to the Supreme Court in response to the state’s proposals, “any solution for the population of Khan al-Ahmar must consider all of the social and cultural elements at play, without ignoring existing conflicts (as was the case in the arbitrary decision to relocate the Abu-Dahoch family from Khan al-Ahmar to residences near Abu Dis).” The planners further stated that, with the help of “Bimkom,” the residents themselves took on the responsibility of initiating a planning process to address the needs of the community and provide sustainable solutions and a long-term vision.

 

Over an extended period, the architects met with the Jahalin families to develop a plan that, while compromising certain aspects of their way of life, acknowledges the spatial limitations of the region. The initial response of the deputy director of the Planning Bureau was an immediate rejection of the plans, as they did not adhere to the criteria set by the Civil Administration. Yet, despite the revised plans being submitted almost four years ago, no professional response has been received from the Civil Administration to date.

Responses to Common Misconceptions

1. "The Palestinian Authority and the European Union settled the residents of Khan al-Ahmar in recent years in order to dispossess Jewish settlement in Area C."

Response: Photographic evidence from as early as 1974 shows the presence of the first tents in Khan al-Ahmar. Over the years, minimal growth has occurred, with the population increasing less than the natural birth rate. Currently, after decades of presence in the region, only 28 families reside in the area. The Civil Administration maintains detailed records of all residents through periodic military censuses. All residents, without exception, belong to the Jahalin tribe, and most of them were born in Khan al-Ahmar. Moreover, the European Union has not constructed a single residential building in Khan al-Ahmar.

2.  "The Bedouins are pawns of the Palestinian Authority and the European Union, both of whom use them for their own needs. The struggle is against the Palestinian Authority, and not the Bedouins."
Response: It is unjustifiable to forcibly remove vulnerable individuals, who have not caused harm to anyone, from their home. Therefore, right-wing factions have fabricated a ‘false enemy’ in the guise of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or the European Union, to rationalize their actions. Framing the situation as a battle against the Palestinian Authority may seem morally justifiable, but it diverts attention from the real issue at hand. By needlessly engaging in a struggle against 28 impoverished families in Khan al-Ahmar, certain groups have unintentionally turned it into a focal point for nationalist tensions associated with the Palestinian Authority. However, it is not too late to rectify the situation. Since temporarily halting efforts to displace the residents of Khan al-Ahmar, the presence of PA officials has diminished, allowing the community to revert to its previous state as a small, peaceful settlement that has embraced a tranquil and modest way of life for decades.
3. “Just as Amona and Nativ Ha’avot were evacuated, Khan al-Ahmar must also be evacuated. What's the difference?”

Response:  The demolition of any family home is undoubtedly a devastating event. Our intention is not to justify the destruction of Jewish outposts, but rather to emphasize the fundamental distinctions that clearly separate these unrelated incidents from Khan al-Ahmar.
The following are the differences:

• Nativ Ha’avot and Amona were evacuated by order of the Supreme Court because they were built on private Palestinian land. Khan al-Ahmar was also built on private Palestinian land, with the permission of the land owners, but the land was expropriated in 1975 and is now considered state land.

• While the Supreme Court ruled that Nativ Ha’avot and Amona should be demolished due to their erection on private Palestinian land, it did not specifically order the demolition of Khan al-Ahmar. Instead, the court ruled that it will not interfere with the state’s considerations. The state has the authority to determine the status of Khan al-Ahmar, as it has done with the illegal construction of surrounding Jewish settlements built long after the establishment of Khan al-Ahmar.

• Despite these differences, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar would be content with a solution similar to what was given to the residents of Nativ Ha’avot. In the case of Nativ Ha’avot, the state funded a move to a temporary settlement a few hundred meters from the original location, is constructing a new neighborhood for Nativ Ha’avot with the necessary modifications, and is providing financial compensation for the move back to the permanent homes. The residents of Khan al-Ahmar, however, are settling for much less – they are willing to evacuate, plan, and build according to a state-approved plan without any compensation, but have not been permitted to do so.

4.  “The Bedouin are criminals for building on land belonging to Jewish settlements in the area.”

It is worth noting the irony here – the same right-wing factions who advocate for the destruction of illegal Bedouin construction are often involved in the establishment of illegal outposts located within just a few hundred meters from Khan al-Ahmar (including Givat Haro’im, Hill 468, and another nearby outpost). This points to a certain level of cynicism amongst the Jewish settlements in the area – they demand the demolition of Kahn al-Ahmar’s structures, while their own commonly accepted practice involves illegal construction followed by obtaining permits retroactively.

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